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The Proposed Regulatory Changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
An Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
No one would want to be responsible for curtailing the
vitality of the multi-trillion dollar mortgage market,' the trillions in
consumer spending it helps to support,2 or the beneficial effects to
the U.S. economy that spring from that spending.' These are the
concerns that Congress must face as it considers overhauling the
regulatory scheme that governs mortgage giants Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.4
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
are chartered by Congress to facilitate the flow of capital to
residential mortgages, thereby supporting home ownership in
America.5 Though federally chartered, these two firms are owned
1. See The Industry, at http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/industry/index.jhtml
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
2. See Home Equity 'Wealth Effect' Fuels Consumer Spending, at
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/finance/commentary/sp-comm_082203.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004).
3. See id; James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan, Consumers Will Keep
Carrying The Ball, Bus. WK., Sept. 22, 2003, at 25-26; James C. Cooper & Kathleen
Madigan, Housing: Still Solid, but Creaking a Little, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 2003, at 29-30;
James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan, The Virtuous Cycle Is Finally Kicking In,
Bus. WK., Nov. 3, 2003, at 25-26.
4. See John D. McKinnon, Bill Takes Aim at Freddie, Fannie, WALL ST. J., June
24, 2003, at A2.
5. See Our Mission, at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/whoweare/mission/
index.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004); The Industry, supra note 1. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are lightly regulated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See Bradley
K. Krehely, Government Sponsored Enterprises: A Discussion of the Federal Subsidy
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 519, 539 (2002). The firms
are able to offer new products with little approval required. Id. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are exempt from SEC regulation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1719(d), (e) (2000).
State and local governments are barred from imposing income taxes, but not
property taxes, on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. See 12 U.S.C. § 1452(e) (2000); 12
U.S.C. § 1723a(c)(1), (2) (2000). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are able to borrow
funds from the U.S. Treasury at favorable rates. See 12 U.S.C. 1719(b), (c) (2000).
The firms also have the advantage of selling their debt through the Federal Reserve;
the United States Treasury is the only other institution allowed to do this. See 149
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by private stockholders, leading to their designation as
government sponsored entities (GSEs).6 Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac purchase mortgages from banks, securitize them, and use the
proceeds to purchase more mortgages.7 The banks use the cash
from the sale of the mortgages to issue more mortgages. 8 The
process thus provides a liquid market for mortgages and greater
capital for the issuance of more mortgages.9  This makes
mortgages easier and cheaper to obtain for homebuyers l
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become goliaths l' in
this secondary mortgage market.12 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
have combined their government subsidies13 with arguably good
business practices to become the preeminent companies in their
industry. 4 The two companies are responsible for approximately
CONG. REC. E1767 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Rep. Paul). A 2001
Congressional Budget Office study calculated that these benefits translated into an
imputed federal subsidy of $13.6 billion annually. See 149 CONG. REC. E972 (daily
ed. May 15, 2003) (statement of Rep Stark).
6. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 324-25 (2001)
7. See Our Mission, supra note 5; The Industry, supra note 1.
8. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 325-27.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
12. A secondary market is one where goods, services, or securities previously
issued, bought, or sold are made available for further buying or selling. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 984 (7th ed. 1999). When investors trade securities on an
exchange, they are trading on a secondary market, as the securities were previously
issued and bought in the primary market via an initial public offering. Id. The
primary mortgage market is the initial issuance of mortgages to homeowners by
banks. See Krehely, supra note 5, at 523; An Investor's Guide to Pass-Through and
Collateralized Mortgage Securities, at http://www.investinginbonds.com/info/igmbs/
an-investors-guide-to-mortgage-securities.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
13. See supra note 5.
14. See supra note 5. Fannie Mae is the country's second largest corporation
based on assets. Understanding Fannie Mae, at http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/
understanding/index.jhtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). Fannie Mae is also one of the
country's largest issuers of debt behind the U.S. Treasury. For the Media - Corporate
Fact Sheet, at http://www.fanniemae.com/media/formedia/factsheet.jhtml (last visited
Feb. 7, 2004). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are responsible for $871 billion and $602
billion in liabilities respectively. FANNIE MAE, 2002 Annual Report 89 (2003)
[hereinafter Fannie Mae Annual Report], at http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/
annualreport/2002/2002annualreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004); FREDDIE MAC,
2001 Annual Report 59 (2002) [hereinafter Freddie Mac Annual Report], at
http://www.freddiemac.com/include/hitbox/track and redirect.html?file=/investors/p
dffiles/annual200l.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). Freddie's 2002 financials are
currently being restated because of the accounting problems which have rocked the
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$2.65 trillion 5 of the $4.1 trillion mortgage-backed securities
outstanding. 6 These institutions have drawn much criticism over
the years from those who think greater oversight is needed due to
the sheer scope of these institutions and the light regulatory
treatment allowed them by Congress. 7 Accounting problems at
Freddie Mac in the spring of 2003 renewed these criticisms 8 and
led to legislation pending in Congress that proposes to increase
oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.' 9
Part II of this note provides an overview of Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the secondary mortgage market.2 °  Part III
discusses the recent accounting problems at Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.2' Part IV analyzes some of the risks associated with
these GSEs and explores the more recent criticisms of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.22 Parts V and VI then examine both the specific
legislation pending in Congress and other proposed changes.23
Finally, Part VI argues that although additional oversight is
needed, it should be developed and implemented carefully. 4
company. See infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. Fannie Mae generated $4.6
billion in net income in 2002, making it one of the world's most productive
companies with 4,700 employees. Understanding Fannie Mae, supra. Freddie Mac
generated $4.1 billion in net income in 2001. Freddie Mac Annual Report at 58.
Fannie Mae currently owns, or holds in trust, one out of every five mortgages in the
United States. See Frequently Asked Questions - Mortgage Industry Primer, at
http://www.fanniemae.com/faq/industry.jhtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
15. See Paula Dwyer, Breaking Up Is Good to Do, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 2003, at
115.
16. See An Investor's Guide to Pass-Through and Collateralized Mortgage
Securities, supra note 12, at 3.
17. See generally Krehely, supra note 5 (discussing the suggested reforms of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at that time).
18. Freddie's Market Bomb, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at A18.
19. See John D. McKinnon, Bill to Overhaul Mortgage Agency Regulation Gains,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2003, at A2; John D. McKinnon, House Drafts Fannie-Freddie
Bill, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at A2; infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 25 - 55 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 56 - 65 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 66 - 95 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 96 - 139 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 140 - 164 and accompanying text.
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II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
In 1938, the Federal government created Fannie Mae and
authorized it to purchase Federal Housing Authority-insured
mortgages.25 In 1968, Fannie Mae became a private company and
its charter was expanded to buy mortgages outside the traditional
government limits. 26 At this time, Ginnie Mae split from Fannie
Mae and became a separate entity with responsibility for special
assistance and housing support programs. 27 Fannie Mae's charter
directs it to "channel [its] efforts into increasing the availability
and affordability of homeownership for low-, moderate-, and
middle-income Americans., 28 Freddie Mac was created in 1970
and charged with purchasing conventional residential mortgage
loans.29 Both entities are shareholder owned, but operate under
federal charters that limit the scope of their activities, while also
providing special benefits.3" Both companies point to the strength
and size of America's secondary mortgage market, compared to
other countries, as evidence that they are meeting their mandate of
making home ownership more accessible and affordable for
Americans.31
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operate in what is known as
the secondary mortgage market.32 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
are limited by their respective charters to the purchase of
residential mortgages.33 The two entities purchase mortgages from
banks and then create a pool of mortgages.34 These pools of
25. Understanding Fannie Mae, supra note 14.
26. Id.
27. See Alan Kronovet, An Overview of Commerical Mortgage Backed
Securitization: The Devil is in the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 288, 291-92 (1997).
28. Understanding Fannie Mae, supra note 14.
29. See, e.g., Kronovet, supra note 27, at 292.
30. See supra note 5.
31. See Understanding Fannie Mae, supra note 14; Our Role Within the Secondary
Market, at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/whoweare/mission/secmkt.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
32. See supra note 12; Frequently Asked Questions - Mortgage Industry Primer,
supra note 14; Our Role Within the Secondary Market, supra note 31.
33. See Understanding Fannie Mae, supra note 14; The Secondary Market for
Mortgage Loans, supra note 31.
34. See Kronovet, supra note 27, at 291-95. The mortgages in a given pool
typically have the same or similar maturities, type (fixed or adjustable-rate), and
270 [Vol. 8
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mortgages are then converted into securities 35 and sold to
investors.36 Rather than owning an individual mortgage, each
security holder owns a percentage of each mortgage in the pool.37
The security holder receives regular returns that are funded by the
mortgage payments made by each borrower toward his or her
mortgage. 38 The security holder is able to invest in mortgages with
less risk, since the loss suffered as the result of any single default is
distributed to all of the security holders.39 Furthermore, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac typically guarantee the mortgages in the
pool, essentially assuming the risk of default.4" The only risk to the
securities investors then is that Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will
default.4 ' Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide a kind of
insurance; they pay out dollars to the pool when an individual
mortgagor defaults.4" As a result of this "insurance," Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are able to sell the securities for more than they
could without this guarantee.43
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use the proceeds from the
sale of securities and the issuance of debt to buy more mortgages
from banks, thereby beginning the aforementioned process again.44
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac borrow from the Federal Treasury
and investors to acquire the money used to buy mortgages and to
provide short-term financing. 45 Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's
earnings are derived primarily from selling the securities for a
higher price than what they paid for the underlying pool of
interest rates. See Effects of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC
Exemptions - A CBO Paper, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Box 1 (May
2003), at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/41xx/doc4l99/05-06-03-GSEs.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
Investors can estimate the cash flow by treating the pool as a single mortgage. Id.
35. The securities are commonly referred to as "mortgage-backed securities."
See The Industry, supra note 1; An Investor's Guide to Pass-Through and
Collateralized Mortgage Securities, supra note 12.









45. See supra note 5.
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mortgages.46 The secondary market provides banks, and other
mortgage issuers, with a liquid market where they can sell an
otherwise illiquid asset for cash.47 The cash is used to issue more
mortgages.48 The banks are also able to move assets with long
term maturities - those subject to adverse movements in interest
rates - off their balance sheets and replace them with cash.49 This
process has the aggregate effect of moving more capital to the
mortgage markets.5 ° This makes mortgages cheaper, via lower
rates and fees, and easier for homeowners to obtain.5
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac derive certain benefits
because of their public-policy oriented mission and special quasi-
governmental status.52 Additionally, other companies with the size
and scope of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac could be at risk of
violating antitrust regulations. Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's
size and scope, however, would seem to be subject only to
curtailment by Congress.53
Although their obligations are not guaranteed by the full
faith and credit of the United States government, their size and
status as GSEs lead many investors to believe that the Federal
government would not allow these entities to fail.54 This presumed
Federal guarantee allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to sell
their securities for even more than they would without such a
presumed guarantee.55
III. ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS AT FREDDIE MAC
In the spring of 2003, Freddie Mac announced that, due to
recommendations from a new auditor, it would be restating
46. See Kronovet, supra note 27, at 291-95.
47. See id. at 289; The Industry, supra note 1.




52. See supra note 5.
53. See Krehely, supra note 5, at 535-38.
54. See id. at 535-38; Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Freddie's Problem and Ours, WALL
ST. J., June 18, 2003, at A17 (arguing that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are "too big
to fail").
55. See Krehely, supra note 5, at 535-38; Jenkins, supra note 54.
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earnings for the previous three years to reflect higher derivatives
earnings.56 Three months later, Freddie Mac terminated three of
its executives because the accounting changes had become
"accounting irregularities."57 This announcement caused Freddie
Mac's stock to lose sixteen percent of its value in one day, with the
stock market "falling broadly" and bond markets "aboil."58 This
situation led to some concern that Freddie Mac was attempting to
either manipulate earnings or disguise problems with its credit
risks.5 9 This raised the concern that Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
could boost their earnings by under-reporting hedging gains or
costs while exposing themselves to greater interest rate movement
risks. This was one of the primary concerns with Freddie Mac's
accounting problems.6 °
Another troubling issue with Freddie Mac's accounting
announcement was that it took nearly three months after Freddie
Mac's initial announcement for the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) to begin requesting more
56. See Mortgage Firm to Delay Release of Earnings for First Quarter, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 26, 2003, at B9.
57. See Freddie's Market Bomb, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2003, at A18. Due to their
heavily leveraged nature, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must use extensive hedging
with derivatives to protect themselves from interest rate swings. Id. Hedging
involves purchasing or selling derivatives whose value depends on a secondary source
such as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity that will change in value in such
a way as to offset changes in value to the holder's assets or liabilities. See BROOME &
MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 813, 821-25; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454, 726 (7th ed.
1999). The derivative thus helps to offset the potentially devastating effects of
interest rates or market values moving in a direction or to a degree unanticipated by
the holder. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 821-25. Freddie Mac held a
pool of derivatives that gained in value and the firm improperly took advantage of an
accounting technique that allowed it to spread the gains out over time rather than
realizing them immediately. See Patrick Barta & John McKinnon, Freddie
Restatement May Be Big, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at C1. This had the effect of
reducing the firm's present earnings but allowed the firm to make its earnings appear
more consistent. Id. Thus, Freddie Mac's investment strategy looks more sound
(gains from derivatives used for hedging are typically indicative that markets are
moving in a direction opposite that anticipated by the holder), and Freddie Mac will
have future gains which could offset future potential losses. Id. This improper
accounting resulted in Freddie Mac understating present earnings by as much as $4.5
billion. See Patrick Barta & John McKinnon, Freddie May Have Understated Profits
By Up To $4.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2003, at C1.
58. Freddie's Market Bomb, supra note 57.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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information from the firm.6' Given that the OFHEO's sole job is
to oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, some found it troubling
that Freddie Mac announced a significant accounting restatement
and the OFHEO did not act more quickly and decisively.62
From the outset of Freddie Mac's accounting problems,
Fannie Mae claimed that the accounting problems were confined
to Freddie Mac and not indicative of any problems at Fannie
Mae.63  Fannie Mae consistently claimed that its finances and
accounting practices were proper.' Notwithstanding these
declarations, Fannie Mae announced on October 29, 2003, that it
had made "computational errors" on its third quarter financial
statements.65
IV. RENEWED CRITICISMS AND CALLS FOR REFORMS OF FANNIE
MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
As a result of the accounting problems initially at Freddie
Mac and then at Fannie Mae, the ongoing calls for reform of these
firms were made with renewed vigor.66 For many years Fannie
Mae's and Freddie Mac's size and complexity had led many to call
for reform. 67 Freddie Mac's accounting problems made those calls
61. Id.
62. See John McKinnon & Michael Schroeder, Regulator Gets Into Hot Water,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at C9.
63. See Jonathan Weil, Volatility at Fannie, Freddie? The Two Are Firm in
Denial, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2003, at Cl.
64. Id.
65. See Patrick Barta & John D. McKinnon, Fannie Mae Made $1.1 Billion Error
In Its Accounting, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at Al. In response to this news, the
interest rates on Fannie Mae's debt securities diverged from interest rates on
comparable Treasury securities. Id. Fannie Mae's stock was "pummeled" but
recovered and closed that day down 2.4% to $73.10. Id. The OFHEO released a
statement the same day "saying that Fannie Mae's error underscored the need for a
closer examination of the company's overall accounting practices the OFHEO is
'about to begin."' Id. Fannie Mae's stock was trading at $77.70 as of Feb. 4, 2004
(based on stock quotes from www.quicken.com).
66. See, e.g., McKinnon, supra note 62; Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Business World:
Freddie's Problem and Ours, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2003, at A17.
67. See generally Krehely, supra note 5 (discussing opponents of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, mainly public policy groups, who argue that the firms receive an
imputed federal subsidy; have moved into new, unwarranted lines of business; control
too much of the secondary mortgage market; allocate their "subsidy" to shareholders
rather than homeowners; and other criticisms).
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more relevant and the reform proposals more drastic. 68
Legislation has been introduced in Congress 69 that proposes to
reform the regulatory structure of the two firms while eliminating
some of the benefits7° they currently receive.7
The most common criticism of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac has been that the oversight by the OFHEO is too weak and
that the Department of Housing and Urban Development is not
the ideal umbrella department for this agency.72 OFHEO has 140
full-time staff members and a budget of $30 million with which to
oversee these two trillion-dollar entities.73 Congress is currently
considering whether to move the agency to the Treasury
Department and increase its regulatory oversight powers.74
The sheer size, scope, and complexity of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac create the potential for "systemic risk."75 Given the
large amount of the secondary mortgage market that they control,
a failure, or even perceived risk of failure, of either firm would
cause shockwaves through the economy that could push the
country into recession or worse.76 The fact that many see an
implied government guarantee protecting these institutions also
raises the possibility that the market is not adequately measuring
and controlling the risk associated with the two firms.77 Even if the
two firms are not in danger of failing, their size means that market
68. See Dwyer, supra note 15; John McKinnon, Snow to Testify for New Oversight
of Freddie Mac, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2003, at A2.
69. See infra note 96.
70. See supra note 5.
71. John D. McKinnon, Bill to Overhaul Mortgage Agency Gains, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 11, 2003, at A2. In the past, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have been able to
stymie serious reform considerations in Congress with their extremely effective
lobbying efforts. See Jenkins, supra note 54; Mike McNamee & Paula Dwyer, Fannie
and Freddie Dodge a Bullet for Now, Bus. WK., Oct. 27, 2003, at 55. Indeed, the
firms' were able to work with Democrats in Congress to prevent a bill requiring
stricter regulation from moving out of committee in the fall of 2003. See id.
72. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16.
73. See McKinnon & Schroeder, supra note 62.
74. See infra note 98.
75. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16; The Trouble With Freddie, WALL ST. J.,
June 13, 2003, at A6.
76. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16.
77. See Krehely, supra note 5, at 530-33; Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs,
THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (May 2001), at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/28xx/doc2841/
GSEs.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
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distortions can occur whenever one firm conducts a major
transaction; the size of the transaction may overwhelm the
liquidity and flexibility of the markets.78
There is some evidence that minimum capital standards at
these two entities are less than what they would be at financial
institutions of comparable size.7 9 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan has urged an increase in a key capital standard for the
two companies. 8° This reflects the concern that these institutions
have too little capital to support the massive amount of debt and
liabilities underlying their equally substantial assets.81 This is the
equivalent of the firms being over-leveraged. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac argue that they are more than adequately
capitalized.82 They further argue that they have become extremely
adept at managing risk so that small amounts of capital can be
used to support larger transactions.83 Critics counter that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac may be adept at handling risk but that is no
78. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16.
79. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115; see also infra note 81 (comparing the
capital-to-asset ratios of the two firms with banking institutions).
80. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115.
81. Id. Fannie Mae has $16 billion in capital which is used to support $887 billion
in assets, giving the firm a capital-to-asset, or leverage, ratio of 1.8%. See Fannie
Mae Annual Report, supra note 14, at 89. Freddie Mac has $15 billion in capital
which is used to support $617 billion in assets, giving the firm a capital-to-asset ratio
of 2.4%. See Freddie Mac Annual Report, supra note 14, at 59. Banking institutions
are typically required to have capital-to-asset ratios, with certain adjustments, of 5%
to be considered "well-capitalized." See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 6, at
515-18; see also Amy Borrus & Paula Dwyer, A New Chaperone For Fannie and
Freddie?, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 2003, at 42. Banking institutions with capital-to-asset
ratios like Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's would be considered "critically
undercapitalized" and "significantly undercapitalized" respectively. See BROOME &
MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 518. Bank of America has a capital-to-asset ratio of
7.2%. See BANK OF AMERICA, 2002 Annual Report 27 (2003) at
http://ccbn16.mobular.net/ccbn/7/169/175/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). BB&T, a
regional bank headquartered in North Carolina, has a capital-to-asset ratio of 9.2%.
See BB&T, 2002 Annual Report 28 (2003), at http://www.bbandt.com/
uploads/qreports/ar42002.pdf last (visited Feb. 7, 2004). Capital-to-asset ratios are a
simplistic means of measuring Fannie Mae's and Freddie's Mac's financial stability.
Banks' assets are typically discounted, increasing the capital-to-asset ratio, based on
the risk associated with the particular asset. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note
6, at 516. The MBSs that make up such a large part of Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's assets are typically considered low risk. Id. However, the firms' portfolios are
not very diversified which implies increased risk. Id. at 519.
82. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16
83. See id. at 16.
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substitute for adequate capital.84 Other critics contend that
because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold the mortgages they
securitize in their own portfolios, they are concentrating risk
rather than spreading it.85 This is due to the fact that rather than
diffusing the risks of mortgage defaults to Mortgage Backed
Securities (MBSs) holders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
aggregating the risks by holding the MBSs in their portfolios.86 A
Senate bill would allow the agency overseeing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to set certain minimum capital levels with more
flexibility.87
Others have argued that too many of the benefits that
spring from Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's special advantages -
exemption from local taxes, ability to borrow at favorable rates
from the U.S. treasury, light regulation, and implicit government
guarantee - are accruing to shareholders and not to homeowners,
the intended beneficiaries of these benefits.8 8 Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are able to retain some of the value of these benefits
and pass them on to shareholders, rather than passing the benefits
directly to homeowners, because there is no statutory requirement
or market force requiring them to do otherwise.89 There is
legislation in Congress that would eliminate some or all of these
special benefits.9 °
The sheer size of the firms also raises the question of
whether the federal government could allow one to fail. Because
of the fallout to the economy if Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were
to collapse,9 the argument runs that the federal government would
have no choice but to step in.92 This implicit guarantee allows the
firms and investors to take risks that they might not otherwise




87. See infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
88. See Krehely, supra note 5, at 522-23; Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs,
supra note 77.
89. See Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs, supra note 77.
90. See infra notes 117-139 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
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government bailout.93 Ironically, this would put the government in
the position of having to fulfill the guarantee.94 Legislation
seeking to eliminate some or all of the firms' special benefits is
partially intended to reduce the public perception of a federal
guarantee.95
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
In response to these concerns, legislation is currently being
debated in Congress that would significantly change the
framework around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.96 Four separate
bills have been introduced in the House and one bill has been
introduced in the Senate.97
A. Transfer of OFHEO Functions to the Treasury Department
House Bill 2803 and Senate Bill 1508 would move OFHEO
from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the
Treasury Department.98 Although not identical, both bills would
make the office an independent department within the Treasury
Department.99 The President would appoint the director of the
new department, subject to approval by the Senate." The
director would act autonomously from the Secretary of the
93. See Krehely, supra note 5, at 535-38. Insofar as there is an implicit Federal
guarantee of these firms, it is noteworthy that their debt, at approximately $1.4
trillion, supra note 14, is not reported as part of the official Federal debt. See Debt
Limit Follies, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2003, at A16.
94. See Krehely, supra note 5, at 535-38.
95. See infra notes 117-139 and accompanying text.
96. Leave No Securities Behind Act, H.R. 2022, 108th Cong. (2003); Secondary
Mortgage Market Fair Competition Act, H.R. 2117, 108th Cong. (2003); Housing
Finance Regulatory Restructuring Act of 2003, H.R. 2803, 108th Cong. (2003); Free
Housing Market Enhancement Act, H.R. 3071, 108th Cong. (2003); Federal
Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2003, S. 1508, 108th Cong. (2003). Despite
indications that some version of this legislation would be passed by Congress in 2003,
at the close of the year, it seemed unlikely than any legislation concerning the
regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would pass before the year was out. See
Mike McNamee & Paula Dwyer, supra note 71, at 55.
97. H.R. 2022; H.R. 2117; H.R. 2803; H.R. 3071; S. 1508.
98. H.R. 2803; S. 1508.
99. H.R. 2803; S. 1508.
100. H.R. 2803.
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Treasury, unless otherwise provided by law.'' The new
department would continue to be funded by assessments from
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but the director would be given
more flexibility in determining the assessments. 10 2 The director
would be prohibited from having any financial interest in either
firm. 
03
The House bill would specifically charge the director with
the duty of ensuring "that the enterprises ... are adequately
capitalized and operating safely."'" To meet this duty, the
director, through the new agency, would be allowed to "issue
cease-and-desist orders, temporary cease-and-desist orders
(including order to take affirmative action), and suspension and
removal orders, and assess civil money penalties.., under the
same procedures and conditions" as the federal banking agencies
are authorized to do "with respect to insured depository
institutions."' 05 Furthermore, the director would be empowered to
establish "safety and soundness standards" in the same manner as
federal banking agencies do for "insured depository
institutions."'0 6 Thus, this new oversight agency would have the
power to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the same
manner and using the same powers with which federal agencies
regulate banks.
The bill would also require major new programs or product
offerings within Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to first receive
approval from the new regulatory office within the Treasury
Department.0 7 The director would be allowed to use informed,
101. Housing Finance Regulatory Restructuring Act of 2003, H.R. 2803, 108th
Cong. (2003).
102. Id.
103. Federal Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2003, S. 1508, 108th Cong.
(2003).
104. H.R. 2803. Currently, the director does not have the power to approve new
programs. 12 U.S.C. § 4513 (2000). His ability to change capital requirements is
limited. Id. His role is primarily limited to reviewing and approving their financial
statements, monitoring of executive compensation, conducting research, conducting
"examinations" of the enterprises, submission of reports to Congress, and the
bringing of limited enforcement actions against the firms. Id.
105. H.R. 2803.
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flexible tests when making a decision about whether or not to
approve a new program."08 Were the Director to deny a request or
a new program, he would have to provide the GSE with notice and
an opportunity to be heard on the issue."'
B. Increased Capital Levels
Senate Bill 1508 also proposes to increase certain minimum
and critical capital levels at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac."° This
change would allow the director of OFHEO (or its equivalent
successor agency) to set these capital levels with more flexibility."
Currently, these capital levels are fixed by statute at minimal
amounts. 12 This would likely increase the amount of capital
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must maintain to support the
massive amounts of liabilities for which they are responsible." 3
This change also answers Alan Greenspan's call for increased
capital levels." 4 However, if the firms are required to maintain
higher capital ratios, this would reduce the amount of assets they
could support with a given amount of capital.' 5 This could reduce
the amount of capital the firms are able to move to the housing
market, reducing liquidity and increasing borrowing costs."
16
C. Elimination of Exemption From State Income Tax
House Bill 2117 seeks to eliminate Fannie Mae's and
Freddie's Mac's exemption from state and local taxes. 17  This
would put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on more equal footing
with their competitors, reducing the imputed "subsidy" they
108. Id.
109. Id.; Federal Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2003, S. 1508, 108th Cong.
(2003).
110. Federal Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2003, S. 1508 § 110.
111. Id.
112. 12 U.S.C § 4613 (2000); 12 U.S.C. § 4502 (2000); see also supra note 81.
113. See supra note 81.
114. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16.
115. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
117. Secondary Mortgage Market Fair Competition Act, H.R. 2117, 108th Cong.
(2003); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(c) (2003); 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (2003).
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receive from the federal government." 8 Arguably, this would
increase competition in the secondary mortgage market while
lessening Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's ties to the
government. 119
D. Elimination of Exemption from SEC Regulation
House Bill 2022 would eliminate Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's exemption from regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 2 ° Although providing no guarantees against
failure, this would increase their disclosure requirements and
provide the transparency many have been seeking. 2 ' After the
accounting scares at Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and given the
significant effects these firms can have on the economy, this would
be a welcome change for many.'22
The SEC registration requirements would apply to Fannie
Mae's and Freddie Mac's stock, MBSs, and debt issuances. 23 The
increased filing costs would represent a negligible amount for each
118. H.R. 2117; see Krehely, supra note 5, at 530-33 (discussing the effects of
Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's state income tax exemption).
119. H.R. 2022. The bill's sponsor, California Representative Pete Stark, argues
that when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were chartered, it was necessary to give
them tax benefits so that they could attract investors for their MBSs allowing them to
thrive and meet the goal of increasing home ownership in the United States. 149
CONG. REC. E972-01 (daily ed. May 15, 2003). Now that both firms are "thriving,
successful private corporations... these two entities are strong and profitable
enough to provide a steady stream of home loan revenue without the state tax-
exempt privilege." Id. Stark further argues that the tax exemption is not warranted
on incentive grounds because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac "underperform the
conventional conforming market in funding the affordable home purchase loans for
borrowers and neighborhoods targeted by the housing goals." Id. Stark finally
argues that with states facing fiscal crises it would only be appropriate to "level the
playing field for Fannie and Freddie's competitors" by exposing "Fannie and Freddie
to the rigors of the marketplace." Id.
120. Leave No Securities Behind Act, H.R. 2022, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003); Effects
of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC Exemptions - A CBO Paper,
supra note 34. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have already begun to voluntarily
comply with some of the registration requirements that would be imposed by
enactment of this legislation. Id.
121. See H.R. 2022; Effects of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC
Exemptions - A CBO Paper, supra note 34.
122. Effects of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC Exemptions - A
CBO Paper, supra note 34.
123. Id.
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firm. 124 These new registration and disclosure requirements would
likely have little effect on the price of the firms' stock or debt, as
purchasers of those securities already have sufficient information
to adequately price the instruments.
25
The increased disclosure requirements would, therefore, be
primarily directed at and have the greatest effect upon the price of
the firms' MBSs. 126 The additional disclosure requirements could
eliminate the "discount" that currently inures to the MBSs because
of buyers' lack of information concerning the underlying
mortgages.'27 Alternatively, enhanced information could allow
investors to infer that MBSs backed by mortgages of different
maturities are more or less likely to be repaid earlier. 28 The risk
of early repayment is known as "prepayment risk."'' 29 This could
lead to segmentation in the MBS market, thereby decreasing the
value of the MBSs and overall market liquidity. 3 ° Increased
disclosure requirements could also cause investors to discount the
124. Id. According to the CBO report, SEC registration fees for debt and MBSs
could reach $250 million in 2004. Id. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could end up
paying half of these fees. Id. If these costs were passed on to borrowers, then the
closing cost of a $200,000 mortgage would rise by less than $25. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id.; infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
127. See Effects of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC Exemptions -
A CBO Paper, supra note 34. There is some evidence that the MBSs trade at a
discount because buyers of MBSs lack adequate information on the maturities of the
different mortgages in a MBS pool. Id. Buyers are, therefore, unable to accurately
gauge the effect of repayment risk on MBSs and tend to overweigh that risk in their
evaluation of the MBSs' value. Id.
128. See Effects of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC Exemptions -
A CBO Paper, supra note 34. Currently, prepayment risk is disseminated across the
MBSs in the market. Id. Increased disclosure requirements would better enable
investors to determine the maturities of the different mortgages in each MBS. Id.
This would allow investors to more easily and adequately determine the overall
prepayment risk associated with a given MBS and better allocate prepayment risk to
MBSs based on the average maturities of the underlying mortgages. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Different investors have different goals and therefore favor different
investments; e.g., risk adverse investors might accept lower returns (greater risk
typically implies greater return) and seek out securities with less repayment risk
(shorter maturities), and investors seeking a higher return might accept higher
prepayment risk and therefore seek out securities with more repayment risk (longer
maturities). Id. Currently most investors are forced to treat the MBS market as one
with somewhat uniform prepayment risk. Id. Increased disclosure requirements
would allow investors to better determine which MBSs better fit their investment
goals. Id. The MBS market would thus segment more with investors targeting their
money at the MBSs fitting their investment goals. Id.
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value of the "imputed" federal guarantee 31 of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. 132 Increased MBS prices would imply some decrease
in the amount of capital flowing to the mortgage market.
133
However, based on the amount of anticipated reduction in the
money flowing to the mortgage market, the new disclosure
requirements are not anticipated to have significantly adverse
effects on mortgage rates.
134
E. Repeal of Special Borrowing Provisions
House Bill 3071 would repeal Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's ability to borrow directly from the United States
Treasury. 35  The benefit provided by the favorable rates is
estimated to be worth as much as $2 billion. 3 6 This bill would also
eliminate Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's ability to sell their debt
to the Federal Reserve. 137 This change would require Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac to compete exclusively on the open market, like
all other firms, for funds to meet their debt and financing needs.,
38
There is no phase-in provision for this change and it is uncertain
how quickly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be required to
replace the debt owed the Federal treasury with privately funded
debt.
139
131. See Krehley supra note 5, at 530-33.
132. Effects of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC Exemptions - A
CBO Paper, supra note 34
133. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. Free Housing Market Enhancement Act, H.R. 3071, 108th Cong. (2003).
136. 149 Cong. Rec. E1767 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Rep. Paul). The
bill's sponsor, Texas Representative Ron Paul, argues that "[t]he connection between
the GSE's and the government helps isolate the GSE management from market
discipline. This isolation from market discipline is the root cause of the recent reports
of mismanagement at Fannie and Freddie." Id. (emphasis added). Paul further
argues that the privileges extended to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have "distorted
the housing market" because the institutions are able to attract capital not under
"pure market conditions." Id. This has led to a bubble in the housing market that
will burden homeowners when it collapses. Id. According to Paul, the ability of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to procure inexpensive debt from the United States
Treasury is effectively an unconstitutional transfer of wealth from tax payers to
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VI. OTHER PROPOSED CHANGES
Beyond the significant changes being proposed in
Congress, other suggestions have been made for additional,
sometimes drastic, changes.14 ° Given the importance of hedging
activities at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the ease of
manipulation, some commentators have called for increased
transparency in these hedging activities. 4 ' If the firms' SEC
exemption is repealed as proposed, the increased disclosure would
certainly be as much or more than what is being sought. 42 Some
legislators are calling for the government to sever its ties with
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,'43 causing the firms to become
completely privatized.'" Some have gone so far as to argue that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be broken into four separate
entities that would then compete against one another to a greater
extent.'45 They believe that the increased competition would lead
to even more benefits to homeowners, while still rewarding
shareholders.'46
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Preferred Solution (s)
The removal or elimination of Fannie Mae's and Freddie
Mac's privileges'47 would seem to be the least controversial of the
reform proposals. Rather than impose regulation or restrictions
on the firms, these proposals would seem to place the firms on a
140. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16. See generally Krehley, supra note 5,
at 528-43 (discussing the problems with and suggested reforms of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac at that time).
141. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16.
142. See id.; Effects of Repealing Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's SEC Exemptions
- A CBO Paper, supra note 34.
143. See John D. McKinnon & Dawn Kopecki, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Targeted
by Republicans To Curb Taxpayer Exposure, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at A2.
144. Id; see also Krehely, supra note 5, at 540-41.
145. See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 115-16.
146. Id.
147. Id. The privileges include exemption from state and local income tax, the
exemption from SEC regulation, and the privilege of borrowing debt directly from
the U.S. Treasury at favorable rates. See supra notes 117-138 and accompanying text.
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more level playing field with competing firms. This would
eliminate the actual or imputed federal "subsidy" that arguably
transfers wealth from taxpayers to holders of MBSs, GSE stock,
and GSE debt.' Such changes would also reduce market
distortions. However, any change that increases the cost of MBSs
could reduce the amount of liquidity in the housing market and
increase the costs of borrowing for homeowners, even if only
slightly. This may be a necessary consequence of having Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac operate in a non-subsidized manner.
Congress should strive to minimize the short-term impact
of any changes by becoming fully informed about the likely
consequences. Congress should also consider the possibility of
proceeding incrementally. If Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
gradually become true market competitors, and the market is
allowed more time to adjust, the likelihood of a debilitating shock
to the housing market or the economy as a whole will be reduced.
The resources and expertise in the Treasury Department
make it a more logical home for Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's
regulator than the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. However, due to the highly independent status the
director would receive under the pending legislation,'49 it is less
important which federal department handles the oversight.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are two of the largest
financial institutions in the country. 5 ° It would seem altogether
fitting and proper for them to be regulated in a manner similar to
banks. The seemingly "hands off" nature of the firms' current
regulator, OFHEO, may have facilitated, or at least allowed, the
accounting problems at Freddie Mac in the spring of 2003 and at
Fannie Mae in the fall of 2003.' Whatever the final shape of any
new regulator, it should use its power to ensure that Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac operate with the soundness expected of large
148. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. If the imputed subsidies were
eliminated there would be nothing to pass on. See Federal Subsidies and the Housing
GSEs, supra note 77. Furthermore, if the two firms were to compete on a more level
market with other firms, benefits would be allocated to shareholders and
homeowners in a manner fairly determined by that market. Id.
149. See supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 14.
151. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
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banks and consistent with the low risk investors expect from GSE
securities. The regulator should proceed cautiously and not
attempt massive overhaul in a short period of time; small,
sequential change would reduce the likelihood that markets would
be disrupted and would help to ensure that any change would be
warranted.'52
It is uncertain whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
truly under-capitalized.'53 Compared to financial institutions of
similar size, they operate with significantly less capital.'54 These
institutions are truly unique, however, and given the low risk of the
investments they deal in (primarily home loans),'55 lower capital
levels may be warranted. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have
exhibited an impressive ability to support significant assets and
liabilities with small amounts of capital, thereby allowing lower
borrowing costs than might otherwise be possible. 5 6  Though
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be required to maintain
higher levels of capital, these levels should be raised slowly and
sparingly. A sharp rise in their capital requirements could force
the firms to reduce their leverage, causing a short-term shock or
panic in the market.
B. Summary
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were chartered by Congress
to facilitate the flow of capital to the housing market, thereby
facilitating the dream of home ownership for more Americans.5 7
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been instrumental over the last
thirty years in helping to bring that dream to millions of
Americans.' 8 To support their mission, Congress granted these
GSEs certain privileges and advantages.'59 Partly due to these
advantages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have grown to dominate
152. See, e.g., supra notes 58, 65 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 81.
155. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
157. See Understanding Fannie Mae, supra note 14; Our Mission, supra note 5.
158. See Understanding Fannie Mae, supra note 14; Our Mission, supra note 5.
159. See supra note 5.
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the market. 6 ° Due to their advantages, and more recently their
market dominance, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become
the subject of criticism and targets for tighter regulation.' 6'
Freddie Mac's and Fannie Mae's accounting problems in the
spring and fall of 2003, respectively, only intensified the
criticism.
6 2
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have likely outgrown the
light regulatory oversight originally given to them by Congress.
Furthermore, the justifications for some of their preferential
treatment are no longer as compelling, and such treatment may
now be unwarranted. Such preferential treatment may be
responsible for market distortions that do a disservice to the goals
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were originally chartered to serve.
163
Congress is right to address these issues and act in a preventive
manner to ensure that a failure or disruption at one of these firms
does not cause serious harm to the economy, or to American
homeowners and investors.
Though Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may have grown
beyond their roots, they continue to play a vital role in our
economy."64 Congress should act to overhaul the regulatory and
subsidy frameworks around these firms, but should do so carefully,
to insure that the harm sought to be preempted is not caused by
the solution.
JASON T. STRICKLAND
160. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 66-93 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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